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ABSTRACT 
The Grenfell Tower fire resulted in the loss of 72 people. The series of events that led to this 
tragedy must be scrutinised by the construction industry beyond the level of the currently 
ongoing public inquiry 
The tower had recently undergone a £8.700.000 ‘revamp,’ with the addition of a new cladding 
system, which, at our current understanding, seems to have allowed the fire to spread with such 
catastrophic consequences.  
A proper Disaster Risk Management framework was, and still is, nonexistent in respect to 
Grenfell Tower and possible many other tall Tennant’s buildings with similar vulnerabilities.  
The de-centralisation and privatisation of key aspects of control and supervision of safety in 
buildings has been implemented by the neo-liberal policies by both Labour and Conservative 
governments over the past 30 to 40 years. Due to this event, a series of questions have been 
raise regarding the choice of materials, the detailing, the certification, the policies and 
regulations within the industry. It will start by exploring and contrast aspects of the 
established “minimum requirement” strategy employed by many Developers and designers, 
the Risk aspects encountered in the process of design, construction and use of the buildings 
and infrastructure; plus the possibilities of using modern digital technology to aid the design, 
construction and occupation process from a Risk management framework  perspective.    
What lessons can be learnt in terms of professional development and ethics for such a 
tragic chain of circumstances to be avoided in the future?  
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INTRODUCTION 
This essay aims to start the process of finding answers to the challenging aspects of 
Ethics in Construction that are posed by the Grenfell Tower Disaster (14 June 2017). 
Three aspects of the Design and Construction Process that encounter Ethical 
challenges. That is, a look into the aspects of “minimum requirements” “risk” and 
“modern technology”.  The aim of the research is to use the Grenfell Tower fire as a 
case study to examine and highlight ethical issues that arise from a tragedy of this 
scale that could have been avoided. The complex nature of the construction process 
and the crossover between the disciplines makes it difficult to allocate direct 
professional liability.  
Therefore, this tragic event must be viewed as “the before and after” of a chapter in 
the serious study of the conflict between public interest and profitable enterprise. 
  
Minimal requirements 
The Hackitt’s Report includes a serious criticism (indictment) to the past and present “culture 
issue across the sector” caused by Ignorance, Indifference, Lack of clarity on roles and 
responsibilities and inadequate regulatory oversight and enforcement tools. (A personal View 
from Dame Judith Hackitt. Forewords to Building a Safer Future- Independent Review of 
Building Regulations and Fire Safety. Final Report. 23 May 2018 Published by Ministry 
of Housing Communities & Local government. Quoted from here as “Hackitt Report 
2018”) 
The Police technical report* catalogue and the expert witnesses reports by Dr Barbara Lane 
and Jose Torero reconstructed the most likely way in which the fire spread through the 
building, and presents a series of damming shortcomings in the choice of design, materials, 
detailing, installations, system, etc.. (Dr Barbara Lane's Expert Report. April 12, 2018). 
The initial fire in the kitchen of flat 16, 4th floor most likely affected the uPVC jamb and sills 
of the kitchen window and fire leaked out into the new combustible cladding installed two 
years earlier. (Professor José L. Torero Expert Report. May 23, 2018). 
Risk Management 
Aspects of risk were not fully understood by the different actors involved with the Grenfell 
Tower project, or perhaps they simply chose to flaunt and ignore those risks in pursuit of 
profit as the Hackitt Report 2018 indicate. (Hackitt Report 2018, p3). 
So appalling was the response by the authorities to the post-disaster phase of the Grenfell 
Tower Fire, that Kensington and Chelsea council was relieved of responsibility for taking 
care of the survivors of the Grenfell Tower on 19 June 2017, and then the Kensington and 
Chelsea Tenant Management Organization was also dismissed on 27 September 2017. 
(Harriet Agerholm, The Independent, 27 September 2017).  
In term of urban resilience, a Disaster Risk Management framework was nonexistent at 
Grenfell Tower. Mitigation and Preparedness were foreign concepts to the Council 
Authorities and the Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization, who 
repeatedly dismissed both important technical and social concern, by the local occupants of 
Grenfell Tower. (Hackitt Report 2018, p8). 
A formal Risk Management Framework as post disaster strategy indicates the need of a 
coordinated Response Phase followed by a Recovery Phase and a Reconstruction Phase. 
(Abhas, et al 2013, p3). Most worryingly in this case, the lack of awareness by local and 
governmental authorities of the scope and seriousness of the tragedy was not apparent during 
and immediately after the tragedy. 
THE TECHNOLOGY ASPECTS 
The Hackitt Report 2018 refers to the ways in which modern technology can be used in 
construction and criticizes the construction industry for its lack of effort in adopting it. In 
addition, the report calls on the construction sector to adopt the rapid development of digital 
tools in the new projects during the design, construction and occupation phases of 
developments, to improve the robustness of the Fire and Emergency response when needed. 
The Hackitt Report request the need of a compulsory Digital record and a Fire and 
Emergency File (Hackitt Report 2018, P36, Table 3, Chapter 2). 
The Building life cycle is further assured by the recommendations suggested to Occupation 
and Maintenance aspects, “to strengthen resident collaboration and partnership with duty 
holders in order to resolve issues”. ((Hackitt report 2018. Page 51, 3.8, Chapter 3). 
Developers have been encouraged to operate by doing the absolute minimum to meet 
regulation standards in their projects, by monetary pressure and/or the government re-writing 
or the abolishing of regulations.  
Using advanced Design and Management tools, this trend can be reverse and a positive 
outcome by incorporating a Risk Management Framework within the system can help the 
Procurement, Design, Construction and Occupation of buildings and infrastructural projects. 
The Digital record and the Fire and Emergency File can be part of this process.  
Our Proposal is of integrating Risk and safety to BIM-like tools used in design and 
construction of projects. 
 
RESEARCH AIMS & METHODOLOGY  
To understand the competing interest in Land Use when building urban resilience. 
The purpose of this section is to clarify the methodological framework used to conduct this 
research.  
The questions that this research will attempt to examine relate to what went wrong with the 
procurement procedure and initiate a critical view to issues of Risk, redundancy, and 
application of modern Digital technology to a Risk Management framework.  
It asks if the current state of Building Regulations, the testing of standards, the use of Design 
and Build and other types of contract are up to the job they were design to accomplish.  
How could a £8.7m public sector refurbishment have resulted in the building becoming more 
unsafe and unfit for purpose? 
What lessons can be learn in terms of professional development and ethics for such a disaster 
to be avoided in the future? 
Do any of the above questions imply unethical construction practices in the name of profit are 
endemic in the UK construction Industry? What impact do Government decisions and 
policies on the quality of private and social housing have? To what extent does the 
government have a duty of care about these issues? If Yes, How this can be reconcile with the 
Neo-liberal policies government of last 40 years are pursuing? 
To what extent have the neo-liberal thinking made our work more dangerous and “fracture 
critically designed “as put by Thomas Fisher in his book “Designing to Avoid Disasters” 
(Fisher, T. 2013). Should the emphasis be placed on designing to avoid disasters? 
All this led to the initial question: What lessons can be learnt in terms of 
professional development and ethics for such a tragic event (Grenfell Tower Fire) to 
be avoided in the future?  
This methodology approach will examine on the one hand how the competing interests in 
land (resources) use process intrinsically contain the seed of conflict (see Infogram 1).  
The construction industry is out of touch with the safe provision of risk and liability, by 
flaunting the use of building standards. The use of the regulations as” minimal requirement” 
as the investigation into the causes of the fire at Grenfell Tower is demonstrating. . 
How systems should be tested and certified to guarantee quality and safety? Professional 
consultants and contractors are expected to behave with integrity and reasonable care, the 
liability in terms of quality will depend on the procurement method.  
In one hand, as the Grenfell Tower procurement process is scrutinized, and new hard answers 
are found; the construction industry will change in important ways.  On the other hand, it is 
key to also examine the UK government decisions and policies on housing and building 
regulations and look at how privatization of certifying bodies may have had an impact on the 
unfit for purpose delivery of the project.  
Once this process of investigation is applied to the Grenfell Tower renovation works, the 
ethical consequences and conclusions can be analyzed, and technological suggestions can be 
presented that could potentially help to prevent another tragedy occurring. A new set of 
















Infogram 1; Competing interests in land use. Used to shows the Economic, Social and 
Environmental factors at play in governance approach to urban policy development and planning. 
(Jha, Abhas Kumar, Zuzana Stanton-Geddes, and Todd W. Miner. 2013. Building Urban 


















COMPETING INTERESTS IN LAND USE 
It is recognized that in the case of Grenfell Tower, a conflict has existed between Grenfell 
Tower residents and The Borough of Kensington and Chelsea and its Kensington and 
Chelsea Tenant Management Organization for several years. The underpinning of this 
conflict is the Local community finding itself unable to participate in Local decisions 
regarding modernization of their homes and area, plus the competing pressure of Modern 
gentrification of sectors neighboring the Estate. These factors put the local inhabitants in a 
situation of great disfranchisement.  
The complains of local activists regarding health and safety issues were disregarded. The new 
additions to the building were felt by many to be a cheap dressing up of the building to 
produce the beautification of the area in benefit of richer adjacent neighborhoods. The non-
existent checks of fire and emergency safety indicate a conflict between in one hand the 
social and environmental aspects and on the other hand the economic aspects seen by the 
local authority as primordial.  
ETHICS AND MINIMAL REQUIREMENTS IN PRACTICE 
“Every aspect of fire safety in Grenfell Tower failed long before 14 
June 2017, the leader of the Fire Brigades Union (FBU) told delegates at the 
annual TUC conference in Manchester …” (TUC 18: Fire Safety 10 Sept 
2018).  
THE HACKITT REPORT 2018: The Hackitt report include a serious criticism to the past and 
present “culture issue across the sector” caused by Ignorance, Indifference, Lack of clarity on 
roles and responsibilities and Inadequate regulatory oversight and enforcement tools. (A 
personal View from Dame Judith Hackitt. Forewords to Building a Safer Future- 
Independent Review of Building Regulations and Fire Safety. Final Report. May 2018 
Published by Ministry of Housing Communities & Local government. Quoted from here as 
“Hackitt Report 2018”). There is an unhealthy relationship between the Construction 
Industry and the establishment, in encouraging a culture of “minimum requirements” to 
permeate the construction process and avoiding dealing with the issues of Risk, uncertainty 
and redundancy, rather than committing all effort to an optimal construction and engineering 
design.  
 
1. Figure1. Window internal new uPVC elements 
 
Figure 2: The origin of the fire in Flat 16, 4th floor + fast vertical 
spread of the flames 
 
. 
The Police technical report* catalogue and the expert witnesses reports by Dr Barbara Lane 
and Professor Jose Torero reconstructed the most likely form in which the fire spread 
through the building and presents a series of damming shortcomings in the choice of design, 
materials, detailing, etc. of the refurbishment work performed at Grenfell Tower.  
 (* The police technical report disappeared from public view some months ago, but its findings are being used by other witnesses’ reports) 
Most of materials used in the new work carried out were combustible, (figure 1) therefore the 
egress and ingress of fire were facilitated by the removal of old windows, the installation of 
new windows shifted out some 185mm from the center-position of the old windows and the 
use of uPVC materials elements to fill the gaps produced by the new installations. (Dr 
Barbara Lane's Expert Report. April 12, 2018). The initial fire in the kitchen of flat 16, 4th 
floor affected the jamb and cills of the kitchen window and flames leaked out to the new 
combustible cladding. The fire rapidly spread vertically aided by the cavity between the 
insulation (Celotex RS5000) attached to the old concrete structure and the aluminum and 
polyethylene core composite material (ACM) Rainobond PE rainscreen. (Prof. Jose 
Torero’s Expert Report. May 23, 2018).  
Omnis Exteriors Director declared to The Guardian Newspaper that the company that 
refurbished the Grenfell tower asked them to supply Rainobond PE which is £2 per sq metre 
cheaper than Rainobond FR, a fire-retardant alternative panel which contains a mineral core. 
(Davies, Rob, Kate Connolly, and Ian Sample. 2017. “Cladding for Grenfell Tower Was 
Cheaper, More Flammable Option.” (The Guardian. June 16, 2017.) The material originally 
requested by 4Architecs submission to the council was Rainobond FR, the fire-proof variety.
 
Figure 3: Gaps filled with Insulation and uPVC elements 
 
Figure 4: Ingress of fire to apartments
CLADDING AND WINDOWS DETAILS; as seen in Figures 3 & 4 details, the design and 
workmanship of the installation of the new windows attached this time to the external 
cladding rather than to the old concrete fabric of the building was to create the combustible 
gap filled with combustible uPVC elements (Figures 1 & 5). These gaps in the fabric of the 
building, plus the design and materials of the curtain walling provides ideal conditions for 
fire and smoke to egress into the cladding and ingress back into de cellular spaces (flats) 
many times until most of the building was consumed killing 72 tenants.  
FIREDOORS DETAILS: One of the unresolved mysteries is the fast spread of smoke and 
flames through the building bypassing two or three fire barriers; the exterior windows, the 
fire-rated entrance flat doors and the stairs fire doors.  
EXITS AND ESCAPE ROUTES: One line of enquire in the investigation process of Grenfell 
Tower fire is related to  the two central aspects of cellular containment to the spread of fire 
that did not performed as envisage. Namely the failure of windows and fire doors to contain 
the spread of fire, inability to contain the toxic gases produced by combustion. The stair well 
was provide with positive air pressure to avoid smoke entering the space even when a fire 
door to stairs remained open. The work for that smoke extraction system was done before the 
refurbishment. 
 
Figure 5 Window installation, old in Black & New in Red, 
shifted 185mm on to the new Cladding. 
Figure 6: Damaged or missing flat door
RESCUE EFFORTS: The inability for people to escape due to the inexplicable rapid spread 
of smoke and flames through 2 o 3 fire doors. The “stay put” instructions that at first were the 
right strategy in normal conditions, where fire-walls and fire doors would have performed as 
intended. The narrowness of stair wells of about 900mm width, and the non-existent rescue 
plan for disabled people from top floors conspired to create a “CASCADE” disaster, one 
which is compounded by several failures in chain (figures 7& 8). According with test performed 
after the tragedy, the Grenfell Tower apartment main doors proved not to comply with the 30 
minutes fire rating. The doors were replaces few years before. As consequence of this test, 
many thousands of door of similar characteristics will need to be remove for high-rise 




Figure 8 : Entrance to flats fire-doors in red
Figure 7 Compartmentation failure of the central corridor, stair 
well and lifts   
 
 ETHICS AND RISK 
RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND REDUNDANCY 
QUALITY, RISK MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY, SOCIAL INCLUSION: In the case of Grenfell Tower, 
contractual aspects are discussed in the other Twin Paper (Grenfell Tower fire: the importance of ethics 
and professionalism for the procurement of safe buildings and infrastructure in the construction industry. 
Voutsadakis. Gonzalez 2018). As urban Planning in poor areas set minimum critical needs as objectives 
of any project, there is always the need for redundancy and alternatives. These redundancies are 
increase by the size and complexity of big project. The most worryingly aspect is the lack of 
understanding of the tragedy shown by local and governmental authorities, as it was apparent during 
and immediately after the tragedy. A normal Risk Management Framework a post disaster strategy 
indicates the need of a coordinated Response Phase followed by a Recovery Phase and a 
Reconstruction Phase. Kensington and Chelsea council was relieve of responsibility for taking care of 
the survivors of the Grenfell Tower disaster on 18 June 2017 after severe incompetence in their 
planning of remedial assistance to survivors of the disaster.(MacAskill, The Guardian 18 June 2017).   
Soon after Robert Black Chief executive of Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management 
Organization was forced to resign to “concentrate on assisting with the investigation and inquiry” 
(Grierson, Jamie, and Haroon Siddique, The Guardian 30 June 2017). Then the management team 
itself , the  Kensington and Chelsea Tenant Management Organization was also dismissed on 27 
September 2017.(Harriet Agerholm, The Independent, 27 September 2017). 
 INDUSTRIALIST’ LOBBY: The fact that the Construction industry and principally manufacturers of 
materials used in new buildings has been actively lobbying to reduce the impact of new legislation 
restricting or banning the type of material used at Grenfell Tower.  Press reports indicate that Director 
of Kingspan, Manufacturers of part of the insulation used at Grenfell Tower, gave speech opposing 
plans by government to ban combustible products from new tower blocks. (Gerad Tubb, Sky News, 19 
June 2018) 
SILENCING VICTIMS – A COMMON OCCURRENCE: Famously for example, Barratt Homes has 
for long time, incorporated all minimal requisites and conform to BRs to their house design processes. 
Where regulations do not exist, the quality of materials and craftsmanship dropped to the lowest level 
permitted. Most cases of bad workmanship and materials are silenced by gaging orders and contractual 
obligations imposed to new buyers. “Silencing those who have reason to complain will make it more 
likely to push down standards in the industry rather than pushing them up” (Ruddick, Graham. 2017 
The Guardian. February 16, 2017.)  
We need to add that the phenomena mentioned by the “Introduction and personal view of the Author 
of Hackitt Report” support the view that some of the corporate actions regarding Quality, Risk 
Management and Safety, Social Inclusion (as they are acting on behalf of the community at large) has 
been replaced by greed, criminal negligence, and corruption. 
ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY 
DEVELOPMENT OF BIM: Developing of BIM–like technology and Risk clash- detection system build-in the 
new digital era is viable way forward in developing robust new safety framework. BIM as a system to design 
construct and use of buildings and infrastructure should incorporate a Disaster Risk Management Frame work 
tools to deal with Uncertainty from day one of the project. 
As developers are technically able to incorporate calculation of minimal requirements to some projects 
(mainly housing) there is the opportunity to reverse the trend. The application can be reversed to a 
more positive use or outcome building up redundancy as a good approach to the equation of Risk 
against uncertainty. 
The incorporation of a standard Fire and Emergency File to be integral part of the BIM process 
and initiated by Client, Principal Designer, Principal contractor and finally by the building 
owner. For an outline of the content of the File, please refer to Appendix D ; Outline of the Fire 
an Emergency File in Hackitt Report, p132 
 
 Conclusion  
This essay is an attempt to start the process of finding answers to the challenging aspects of Ethics in 
Construction.  It begins by exploring and contrasting aspects of the established “minimum 
requirement” strategy of many Developers and designers, the Risk aspects encountered in the process 
of design, construction and use of the buildings and infrastructure; plus  the possibilities of using 
modern digital technology to aid the design, construction and occupation process from a Risk 
management framework  perspective.    
There is the need to support all effort towards a more robust solution to uncertainty and risk not 
previously encountered. It is needed of a more flexible approach to the solution of constructional 
problems, not committing large efforts to an infrastructure that could become soon obsolete. 
The risk of disasters or crisis is highly uncertain, therefore, there exists a need to build in some 
redundancy, to help the difficulties of not knowing the entire unknown risk not yet encountered. To 
better manage these unknowns, the use of digital technology widely available and in constant 
development could provide an affordable, robust and safe solution.  
The assurances that after the long process of proposal, design construction and occupancy, it will be 
possible to plot the history of the development with all the aspects of risk, fire and emergency or other 
risk factors be available to the users, being them the tenants, owners or members of the Public services 
(Fire, Police, ambulance). 
The incorporation of a standard Fire and Emergency File to be integral part of the BIM process and 
initiated by Client, Principal Designer, Principal contractor and finally by the building owner would be 
an acceptable route to take after Grenfell Tower disaster. 
The Hackitt Report ask in Appendix E (p134) aspect of competence, continuing Professional 
Development etc. to be taken by Professional Bodies within the Construction Industry. In particular 
ask Professional institutions, Engineering, Architecture, Building Control Inspections and many others 
to collaborate with improved competence; 
The fact that the repercussions and changes within the Construction Industry will also affect the 
academic world. Aspect of superior quality testing, risk management and its contents of mitigation, 
preparedness etc. need to be included at Technical institutions. They will need to be studied in the 
context of the new ethics of a flexible and dynamic outlook to build resilience further than the mere 
“minimum requirement”. 
END 
*Figures 1-8 All Photographs and drawings from Barbara Lane's Expert Report." April 12, 2018.  
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